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Abstract The underdeveloped institutional framework and trade barriers between
China’s provinces make cross-province acquisitions challenging. We explore how
Chinese firms can mitigate this problem. Drawing on social network theory we
propose that cross-province rotation of political leaders—a key element of the
promotion system of political cadres in China—is a mechanism enabling growth
through cross-province acquisitions. We conceptualize rotated leaders as brokers
between two geographically dispersed networks. We contribute to the literature on
the characteristics of Chinese social networks, the effect of political connections on
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Introduction
Research on the business and strategy of Chinese firms rarely discusses domestic
acquisition growth (Zhu and Zhu 2016). Weak factor markets, institutional voids,
and a lack of independent decision-making and managerial skills in Chinese firms
all render domestic acquisition growth highly problematic (Peng and Heath 1996). It
is further aggravated by the fragmented domestic market, and the environment is
especially challenging for private firms (POEs) that in the context of state control
over resources such as finances as well as market and corporate information have
poor access to such critical inputs compared to state-owned firms (SOEs) (Boisot
and Meyer 2008; Chen et al. 2011; Young 2000; Xu et al. 2010).
Interestingly, empirical evidence on firm acquisitions in China seems to diverge
from this view. Tang and Metwalli (2012) estimated that over 90% of all acquisitions
conducted by Chinese firms between 2000 and 2010 were domestic. Moreover,
according to other statistical observations, over 40% were completed by POEs and
over a quarter of all deals were conducted with targets located outside the province of
the acquiring firm (Chi et al. 2011). These values are all non-trivial, indicating that
despite various obstacles, Chinese firms do engage in domestic acquisition growth.
Hence, in this study we investigate the following research question: How do Chinese
firms overcome barriers associated with cross-province acquisition growth?
We propose that cross-province rotation of political leaders, which is part of the
promotion system of political cadres set up by the Chinese government (Ke 2015), is a
mechanism that can allow firms to overcome barriers associated with cross-province
acquisition growth. Borrowing from social network theory (Burt 1992), we
conceptualize a rotated leader as a broker between two relatively closed provincial
business–government networks who can offer both network information and
reputation benefits, which otherwise would not be available to them. Since
business–government networks in two different provinces are bridged by a rotated
leader, an acquisition could originate from either of the networks. To capture the
direction of these processes, we distinguish between outgoing and incoming political
rotations. An outgoing political rotation opens up acquisition opportunities for firms
located in the political leader’s former province, whereas an incoming political
rotation offers such opportunities to firms in the new province. Building on social
network theory, we propose that incoming political rotation has a stronger effect on
cross-province acquisition growth compared to outgoing. Finally, we investigate how
the institutional heterogeneity of Chinese provinces—which adds to the fragmenta-
tion of the Chinese market for corporate control—and firm ownership moderate the
effect of incoming political rotation on cross-province acquisitions. Our results show
that outgoing and incoming political rotations are both catalysts of cross-province
acquisitions and that POEs located in less-developed provinces and aiming to acquire
targets in more-developed provinces, benefit most from incoming political rotation.
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Our study makes several contributions. We inform the literature investigating
social networks in emerging markets (Batjargal 2007; Jansson et al. 2007;
Michailova and Hutchings 2006; Sheng et al. 2011). Previous studies show that
Chinese networks tend to be dense, with few structural holes, thus limiting the
ability of network members to obtain novel information, something that in turn may
have far-reaching implications for firm strategy and innovation (Batjargal 2007).
However, we show that business–government networks offer brokerage opportu-
nities when political leaders are rotated from one such discrete dense network to
another. Our study thus offers novel insights into how firm managers in China may
access non-redundant geographically distributed information. We also contribute to
the literature investigating the political capital of firms (Jia 2014; Özcan and
Gündüz 2015) and show that the spatial effects of social networks cannot be
captured by the traditional measures of political connections in China.
Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on business–government relationships in
China by investigating the effect of political connections on firm strategy (Chen et al.
2014; Li et al. 2012). Finally, we show that rotated political leaders have an impact not
only in their new provinces, which have been the focus of prior studies within public
economics and administration (Zhu and Zhang 2016), but also in the provinces they
previously served. Hence, we suggest that the rotation of political leaders could be used
as a public policy tool instigating cross-province business activities.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
The gradual transformation of a planned economy in China towards an open market,
which began in the early 1980s, required a significant revision of the institutional
framework, including legalization of the private sector, privatization of SOEs, and
the establishment of market intermediaries. This transformation has resulted in a
system where formal institutions are subject to great change, market and regulatory
information is opaque, and the institutional framework has voids (Hitt and Xu 2016;
Puffer et al. 2010; Tan et al. 2009). Such conditions of the formal institutional
framework elevate uncertainty in doing business.
In such environments, firms’ reliance on informal institutions to achieve business
goals play a larger role (Peng and Heath 1996; Peng et al. 2008; Puffer et al. 2010). In
China, one important informal institution is interpersonal networks (guanxi) (for a
review see Chen et al. 2013).Guanxi ties are governed by reciprocity and obligations,
have strong in-group favoritism and a long-term orientation with regard to returning
favors (Gu et al. 2008; Xiao and Tsui 2007). Such ties, as well as offering reputational
benefits, are conduits for the transfer of information and other resources between firms
(Barbalet 2017; Sheng et al. 2011; Xiao and Tsui 2007). Indeed, in China ‘‘who you
know is more important than what you know’’ (Yeung and Tung 1996, p. 54). In the
context of state capitalism in China, where control over banks, land, and information
rests with the government, cultivating ties with political stakeholders becomes an
important strategy (Peng and Luo 2000; Tan et al. 2009). In the case of firm
acquisitions, considering the amount of risk and investment that this strategy entails
(Pablo et al. 1996), reliable information about target firms, access to finances to fund
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the deal, and contract enforcement become crucial. For example, in China, firm’s
accounting data are often unreliable even in the case of listed firms, and corporate
information is often controlled by the government, so only firms with political ties
have a chance to access the kind of information that is critical for due diligence
(Piotroski and Wong 2013; Xu et al. 2010).
In the case of cross-province acquisitions, cultivation of political ties for acquiring
firms becomes even more indispensable, for two reasons. First, historically, Chinese
provinces have largely been isolated from each other, and during the planned
economy each province aimed to be a self-sustaining industrial system (Ke 2015; Xu
2011). This is still reflected in local governments having considerable power over
economic and administrative matters within their jurisdictions, creating significant
differences in laws and regulations across provinces (He et al. 2008; Xu 2011). This
relative isolationism has also led to cross-province variations in informal institutions
such as local customs, dialects, and even propensity to risk-taking (Fang 2005). Due to
the absence of an integrated national market and inefficient market intermediaries,
local information does not flow easily across provinces (Chang and Xu 2008). Hence,
acquiring a target in another province requires not only covering costs related to the
deal per se, but also covering additional costs of obtaining, analyzing, and verifying
information on the target province’s formal and informal institutions. Considering
that guanxi, like any other network, is subject to geographical proximity between
actors (Li et al. 2008; Lu et al. 2014) and is unlikely to span various relatively closed
provinces, the task of how to access the information necessary for cross-province firm
growth represents an important business challenge.
Second, the confluence of the fiscal federalism regime and the promotion system
of political cadres presents firms with considerable discriminatory challenges in
another province. On the one hand, fiscal federalism is a regime in which provincial
governments must hand over a significant proportion of their income to Beijing,
thereby limiting the funds available for provincial development. On the other hand,
the promotion system of political cadres is set up in such a way that a political
leader’s promotion is conditional on economic growth and the fulfillment of public
policy programs in the respective jurisdiction (Li and Zhou 2005). The co-existence
of the two systems creates a bi-directional relationship between business and
government within a province (Shi et al. 2014). Specifically, it is not only firms that
become interested in cultivating political ties to access various resources, but also
the local government, which is deeply incentivized to maintain a relationship with
local business to encourage not only its product output, but also achieve social
objectives like maintaining low unemployment rates (Lee and Jin 2009). One way
provincial leaders can achieve both goals is by protecting local firms from inter-
province competition by establishing tariff and non-tariff barriers to firms from
outside the province (He et al. 2008). Local governments have been found to engage
directly in discrimination against firms from other provinces and thwart acquisition
attempts by outside firms from fear of losing control over local firms (Eberhardt
et al. 2013; Peng et al. 1999; Young 2000). This institutional dynamic intensifies the
challenge of building political ties across provinces for cross-province growth.
We propose that the institution of rotating provincial leaders offers access to
business–government networks in another province that may be used for cross-
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province acquisitions between the two provinces. In contrast to other federalist
countries, provincial leaders in China are not elected, but appointed by the central
government, and serve for terms of 5 years in a province with a maximum of two
terms in the same province. The rotation system was introduced in the 1990s and is
deployed as a measure of personnel control to ensure the alignment of central-local
government interests, to reduce corruption and faction formation between party
cadres, to disseminate successful experiments with institutional development across
provinces, and to stimulate provincial integration (Ke 2015; Xu 2011; Zhang and
Gao 2008).
Drawing from social network theory (Burt 1992), we conceptualize a rotated
leader as a broker between business–government networks in the former and new
provinces. Prior research has established that local leaders develop strong and
lasting ties with businesses in their jurisdiction (Li et al. 2008; Li and Zhang 2007;
Shi et al. 2014). Moreover, there is some evidence that such close relations endure
also when leaders are rotated to other provinces (Du et al. 2015). Hence, a rotated
leader becomes uniquely embedded in two geographically separated networks
serving as a conduit of novel, and otherwise unavailable, information to these
networks. By the same token, a rotated leader may even become a transmitter of
reputation by directly linking actors across the two networks (Bell and Zaheer 2007;
Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Yang et al. 2011). A rotated local leader facilitates cross-
province economic exchange by offering non-redundant information about market
conditions and business opportunities that lower transaction costs and confer
legitimacy, thus leading to lower discrimination risks for firms in both provinces.
Based on this, we formulate our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Outgoing and incoming political rotation is positively related to
cross-province acquisitions between two provinces.
We further propose two arguments suggesting that the likelihood of initiating a
cross-province acquisition is different for firms located in the former or in the new
province. Usually, a newly rotated provincial leader is unfamiliar with the local
context (Zhang and Gao 2008) and because social ties require time to cultivate
(Reagans 2005) does not have a strong relationship with the local business
community. First, this implies that any information a rotated leader might have
about the new province is less extensive compared to their knowledge about their
former province. This means that firms from the leader’s former province will
benefit less from the rotation relative to firms in the province to which the leader is
rotated.
Second, brokers are not only conduits of non-redundant information and
resources, but they can also leverage this unique position for personal benefit
(Kauffeld-Monz and Fritsch 2013). Strong ties with the new business community
are crucial for a provincial leader to succeed in instigating local growth on the one
hand, and charging local firms with the fulfillment of various social goals on the
other. Hence, we can expect that a rotated leader will seek ways to accelerate
building strong relationships in the new province through engaging in reciprocal
interactions with the local business community. One way to do this is to ensure that
local firms have opportunities for cross-province growth that are difficult to come by
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otherwise. Another way is to impose a limit on acquisitions incoming from the
former province, as this might be perceived as a threat to the local business
community, and, therefore, depress the establishment of strong guanxi ties. We
propose:
Hypothesis 2 Incoming political rotation has a stronger positive impact on cross-
province acquisitions than outgoing.
Heterogeneity of provincial institutional development in China implies that
government intervention in the economy, access to market information and other
resources, and reliance on informal institutions to achieve business goals vary across
provinces (Choi et al. 2015; He et al. 2008). Based on this, we propose that having a
bridge to business–government networks in another province may be more valuable
for firms from less-developed provinces. In line with the thesis that social ties
substitute for poorly functioning institutions (Xin and Pearce 1996), in the presence
of greater institutional voids, firms from less-developed provinces rely on networks
to achieve business goals more than firms from more-developed provinces. Hence,
firms from less-developed provinces are more likely to strategically cultivate guanxi
with a newly rotated leader. Furthermore, firm performance and productivity are
lower in less-developed provinces (Chen 2015; Choi et al. 2015), so it is likely that
competitive firms located in such provinces have a smaller pool of suitable targets,
which increasingly make them look for cross-province growth. More importantly,
these firms may wish to acquire targets in more-developed provinces to obtain
technologies and know-how and to have access to more munificent environments
(Farrell and Lin 2011).
At the same time, firms from less-developed provinces are likely to have lower
legitimacy as viable businesses in the eyes of the government in more-developed
provinces. Using an analogy with international business, firms from less-developed
provinces may be perceived as interested in transferring strategic assets back to the
headquarters and, therefore, not be conducive to local economic growth (Deng 2013).
Such lack of legitimacywouldmake the target province’s local government reluctant to
approve an acquisition or, if approved, lead to higher risk of arbitrary discrimination.An
incoming political rotation from a more-developed province may be particularly
important for firms from less-developed provinces, because a rotated leader’s support
may mitigate negative effects of low legitimacy and help avoid future discrimination.
These two lines of reasoning lead us to formulate the following:
Hypothesis 3 The effect of incoming political rotation on cross-province
acquisitions is particularly strong for firms from less-developed provinces aiming
to acquire in more-developed provinces.
We further propose that the above is particularly pertinent for POEs. In the
process of moving from the planned to the market economy, private ownership
became legally recognized only in the mid-1990s. Yet POEs in China are still
resource-constrained and have lower government support compared to SOEs (Du
et al. 2015). Nonetheless, Chinese POEs have adapted by becoming more ingenious,
gaining more with fewer resources and seeking to exploit any possible opportunity
(Peng 2001). In addition, they have learned to strategically cultivate political ties to
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overcome a ‘liability of privateness’ to foster their growth (Chen 2007; Li et al.
2012). Prior research has documented that they do indeed cultivate relationships
with political stakeholders and benefit from them more than SOEs (Peng and Luo
2000; Xin and Pearce 1996). At the same time, POEs have top-management-driven
ambitions to expand across China, and they suffer the most from the underdevel-
oped institutional environment (Chen et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2008). Hence, in less-
developed provinces, POEs in particular have the ability and motivation to utilize
the brokerage position of a rotated leader. We propose our last hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The effect of incoming political rotation on cross-province
acquisitions is particularly strong for POEs from less-developed provinces aiming
to acquire in more-developed provinces.
Method
Data
The sample covers acquisition deals between provinces in mainland China
completed by firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between
2003 and 2012. The primary source of cross-province acquisition deals is Bureau
van Dijk’s ZEPHYR database, which was further verified and extended by drawing
from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database produced
by the GTA Information Technology Co. Ltd. and the China Accounting and
Finance Research Center, which covers firm information on publicly traded firms.
The firm-level data come from CSMAR; if the information was not available in the
database, we searched for it in annual reports. The key acquisition deal information
used in the analysis is an acquiring firm’s headquarters location, i.e., the home
province, and a target firm’s location, i.e., the host province. Only deals involving
the transfer of control rights, i.e., the final stake in a target firm being equal to or
above 50%, were included. This restriction was applied to ensure that deals were
substantial enough to observe the effect of political rotation on the number of cross-
province acquisitions. The number of firms in the sample is 358.
Measures
In this study, the dependent variable is the number of cross-province acquisitions
completed by the sampled firms each year between 2003 and 2012. The number of
deals varies between zero and two for each year-dyad. Overall, 432 cross-province
acquisition deals were completed in this time period, or over 1.2 cross-province
acquisition deals per firm.
The key independent variable of this study is political rotation between
provinces. The data came from the China Vitae database on Chinese leaders, which
includes detailed biographies of provincial party secretaries and governors, and
which has been used in prior studies (Jia et al. 2013). In this study, we focus on
provincial rotation of the political elite, such as party secretaries and deputy
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secretaries, provincial governors and deputy provincial governors (Persson and
Zhuravskaya 2008; Zang 1991). Only the top political leaders were taken into
consideration, because cadres at the lower levels of the political hierarchy may be
motivated to engage in rent-seeking rather than build reciprocal ties with the local
business community (Ma et al. 2012, p. 23); therefore, the hypothesized
relationships between rotated leaders and firms would not apply to them. Ministerial
leaders are on the same bureaucratic level as provincial leaders, and therefore the
movement of provincial leaders between their respective provinces and ministries in
Beijing is also considered a political rotation (Wu 2010).
Several notes should be made regarding what we do not consider to be a political
rotation. First, promotions are not coded as political rotations if the official did not
change provinces while being promoted. For the reason stated above, only
promotions between deputy and higher positions were considered, i.e., promotions
of officials from lower hierarchical levels to deputy-level positions, even while
changing provinces, are not counted as political rotations. Second, and similarly,
demotions and retirements, even when they involve changing provinces, are not
considered political rotation. In China’s political economy, demotions and
retirements involve the movement of leaders to relatively powerless positions (Li
and Zhou 2005). In fact, demotions are quite rare and some may even be disguised
as retirements to avoid provoking social unrest (Li and Zhou 2005). On any account,
such leaders are no longer motivated to engage with the local business community
in the same way as those in power, because their career progression no longer
depends on it. Hence, such political movements are outside the scope of the
hypothesized relationships. Fourth, the biography of the officials, i.e., the province
of birth, schooling, and work prior to attaining a position as deputy secretary or
deputy governor, is not considered in the measurement. Fifth, rotations of officials
across provinces prior to 2003 are not considered.
The total number of provincial deputy secretaries, deputy governors, secretaries,
and governors who changed provinces when moving to equivalent or higher
positions between 2003 and 2012 is 57; 66% of these officials were subject to only
one rotation (rotation between two provinces), and the rest were rotated between
more than two provinces. The maximum number of rotations completed by one
official is three, e.g., Hu Chunhua, rotated at top provincial ranks between Tibet,
Hebei, Inner Mongolia, and Guangdong (three rotations). The total number of
political rotations in the given time frame is 74.
Political rotation is captured by two variables: outgoing political rotation and
incoming political rotation. Since we are investigating the business–government
relationship within a dyad of provinces, then political rotation and acquisition can
happen in both directions within the dyad. An outgoing political rotation opens
acquisition opportunities for firms in the leader’s former province, or, in other
words, an acquisition could have been made in the same direction between firms in
the same two provinces as the political rotation. It is coded ‘1’ for each dyad-year
when such a bridge was made by political rotation, and ‘0’ when no political
rotation occurred between the two provinces in this direction. Incoming political
rotation opens acquisition opportunities for firms in the new province: in other
words, an acquisition could have been made in the direction from the leader’s new
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province to the former province. It takes on a value of ‘1’ for each dyad-year when
such a bridge existed, and ‘0’ when there was no political rotation in this direction.
The first moderating variable of the study is firm ownership, which we proxied by
state shareholding, which runs from 0 to 100%, suggesting that POEs are those
having no shares owned by the state (0%), all the rest being SOEs. This variable is
based on information about the ultimate owner provided by the CSMAR database,
which captures owner identity and percentage of shares owned in the firm. We
followed Delios et al. (2006) and measured state shareholding as the percentage of
shares owned by the central government, local governments, and government-
related agencies.
Another moderating variable in our study is the absolute difference in the levels
of institutional development between acquiring and target provinces. We identified
it as the marketization-index difference between the two provinces produced by the
National Economic Research Institute, Beijing, China (Fan et al. 2011; Wang et al.
2016). It is composed of five sub-indices: (1) the relationship between government
and market, (2) the development of a non-state economy, (3) the level of product-
market development, (4) the level of the essential factor-market development, and
(5) the development of market intermediate organization and the legal-system
environment. This index is widely used in studies focusing on the impact of the
level of institutional development of Chinese provinces on firm strategy.
When accounting for alternative explanations for the number of cross-province
acquisitions, we selected several firm-level control variables. First, we control for firm
acquisitions in a target province, which we coded ‘1’ if a firm has majority-owned
subsidiaries in a target province prior to the focal acquisition, and ‘0’ if it does not
have any subsidiaries in a target province. Firm acquisition in a target province
indicates a ‘foothold’ in a focal target province, which should reduce a firm’s need for
political support. This is in line with studies in international business suggesting that
acquisition experience in a foreign country increases the chance of further
acquisitions in that country (Collins et al. 2009). We also include the top manager’s
experience in the target province, which is coded ‘1’ if a chairman of the board, whose
role in most respects is equivalent to that of a CEO inWestern firms, was born, studied
at higher-education institutions, or worked in a focal province, otherwise ‘0.’ Also, we
control for a top manager’s political ties, which are defined as managerial ties to the
government. In line with prior studies (Li et al. 2012), this variable is equal to ‘1’ if a
chairman of the board is or had been an official of the central government, local
government, industry bureau or military, otherwise it is set at ‘0.’
Two additional firm-level control variables are included—firm performance and
firm size—both of which are likely to intensify cross-province acquisitions, since
they indicate a firm’s resource endowment (Lu et al. 2014). Firm performance one
year prior to a focal acquisition is proxied by a logarithm-transformed return on
assets (ROA), defined as net income divided by total assets, which is a common
accounting measure of performance widely used in studies on firm acquisitions
(Zollo and Singh 2004). Firm size was calculated as a logarithm-transformed value
of a number of firm employees 1 year prior to a focal deal (Liang et al. 2012).
Finally, we control for the market-size difference between home and host
province, defined as a logarithm-transformed absolute difference in Gross Regional
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Product (GRP) levels between two provinces in a dyad (Tsang and Yip 2007). Large
market size is attractive for acquirers, hence instigating acquisitions from less- to
more-developed countries (Ellis 2008). In China, conducting business in less-
developed provinces might be advantageous due to lax taxation, cheaper labor, and
more accessible land (KPMG 2012). In light of the Chinese government’s use of
acquisitions to restructure its economy and advance personal or local gains, SOEs
can be significantly underpriced, thereby increasing their attractiveness as targets.
This makes acquisitions from larger to smaller markets more plausible (Tsang and
Yip 2007). The data for this variable were taken from China Statistical Yearbooks
2004–2013. Similarly to the marketization-index difference between home and host
provinces, market-size difference varies between negative and positive values,
where negative values indicate that an acquiring province has a smaller market size
compared to that of a target province. We also control for industry using Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes by including industry variables in all models.
Analytical approach
Our analytical approach is directly linked to the construction of our sample. In order
to establish the relationship between political rotations and cross-province
acquisitions over the course of 10 years, we included in the sample all political
rotations between all administrative regions in China and all majority rights transfer
cross-province acquisitions that took place in the selected timeframe. This strategy
is important to generate unbiased results because every year some provinces were
involved in political rotations and some were not. Likewise, every year a firm may
or may not have engaged in a cross-province acquisition and this acquisition may or
may not have occurred in a dyad of provinces that involved a political rotation.
Hence, for our purposes, it was important to cover the whole totality of possible
combinations of destinations of political rotations and cross-province acquisitions.
To achieve this, in the sample construction we allowed for the possibility that each
firm each year had a chance of entering any of the thirty administrative regions in
China outside of the home location. The total sample size is then 358 firms
multiplied by 10 years and by 30 administrative regions, yielding 107,400 firm-
year-target province observations.
Our data, thus, have a hierarchical structure; years of observations (j = 1, … 10)
are nested under acquiring firms (k = 1, … 358), and potential target provinces
(l = 1, … 30) in turn are nested under years of observations. Since our dependent
variable is non-negative and discrete, and its sample mean equals its variance
(M = s2 = 0.004), we specified a Poisson distribution and a logarithmic link
function. To analyze the data we use a generalized linear mixed model.
Results
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix are presented in Table 1. The values
display statistically significant correlations between several of our independent
variables and the number of cross-province acquisitions, all with the expected signs.
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Table 1 Correlation table
Independent variables Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
1 Number of acquisitions 0.00 0.06
2 Firm performance 7.82 0.05 - 0.00
3 Firm size 7.39 1.74 0.00 - 0.06**
4 Top manager’s political ties 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.05** 0.01*
5 Top manager’s experience in a
target province
0.03 0.17 0.01** - 0.00 - 0.02** 0.00
6 Firm acquisitions in a target
province
0.17 0.32 0.03** 0.02** 0.06** 0.04** 0.18**
7 Market-size difference 0.59 1.26 - 0.03** 0.05** 0.04** - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.02
8 Marketization-index (MI)
difference
1.43 2.57 - 0.03** - 0.01** 0.06** - 0.02** - 0.01** - 0.02** 0.77**
9 State shareholding 19.02 24.21 0.01 - 0.00 0.19** - 0.04** - 0.01* 0.00 - 0.09** - 0.05**
10 Outgoing political rotation 0.14 0.35 0.01** 0.01* 0.02** 0.00 0.03** 0.03** - 0.06** - 0.01** 0.07**
11 Incoming political rotation 0.11 0.32 0.02** - 0.02 0.07* 0.00 - 0.00 0.02** - 0.13** - 0.05** 0.13** 0.22**


























In particular, firm acquisitions and top manager’s experience in a target province are
positively related to cross-province acquisitions in that province, and both market-
size and marketization-index differences are negatively related to the dependent
variable. Outgoing and incoming political rotations are both weakly, but signifi-
cantly, related to the dependent variable (r = 0.01 and r = 0.02, p\ 0.05
respectively), and they are positively correlated (r = 0.22, p\ 0.05). This indicates
that for some provincial dyads political rotation occurs in both directions
simultaneously. There is also a highly positive and significant (r = 0.77,
p\ 0.01) relationship between market-size difference and marketization-index
difference, suggesting that the level of economic development and the level of
institutional development go hand-in-hand. To test the implications of this, we ran
robustness checks excluding market-size difference due to its high correlation with
marketization-index difference. The results remain unchanged.
The results of our regression models are presented in Table 2. Model 1 is a null
model with control and moderating variables only, in Model 2 we add our political
rotation variables, Model 3 tests the interaction effects between incoming political
rotation and marketization-index difference, and Model 4 is a full model with a
triple interaction term between incoming political rotation, marketization-index
difference, and state shareholding. To provide additional evidence with regard to the
effect of outgoing political rotation on cross-province acquisitions compared to
incoming political rotation, we included mirrored interaction effects with an
outgoing political rotation variable in Models 3 and 4.
The findings of the null model demonstrate that top manager’s experience in a
target province (b = 0.41, p\ 0.05) and firm acquisitions in a target province
(b = 1.01, p\ 0.001) are both positively and significantly related to the dependent
variable. In fact, the latter variable has the strongest effect size on the number of
cross-province acquisitions in all Models. We test Hypothesis 1 that outgoing and
incoming political rotations lead to more cross-province acquisitions and Hypoth-
esis 2 specifying that incoming political rotation is a stronger predictor of cross-
province acquisitions in Model 2. Both political rotation variables are statistically
significant at p\ 0.05 and p\ 0.01, respectively, offering strong support for
Hypothesis 1. The comparison of beta coefficients of these two variables
demonstrates that incoming political rotation has a larger impact on the number
of cross-province acquisitions than outgoing (0.45 and 0.27, respectively). In
addition, we ran a Wald test to measure the difference between the two beta
coefficients. It appeared that the two coefficients were not significantly different
from zero (D(coef) = 0.19, p = 0.17). In other words, we can claim that the
coefficients differ only descriptively and not statistically. Hence, we find no support
for Hypothesis 2.
Model 3 includes two sets of interaction effects testing Hypothesis 3, that the
effect of incoming political rotation is stronger when acquisitions run from less-
developed acquiring provinces to more-developed target provinces. The results are
not statistically significant, thus we do not find support for Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4, that the effect of incoming political rotation is stronger for POEs
located in less-developed provinces and aiming to acquire firms in more-developed
provinces, is tested in Model 4. To do this, we constructed a triple interaction effect
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Table 2 Regression results, number of cross-province acquisitions is a dependent variable
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 (H1, H2) Model 3 (H3) Model 4 (H4)
Firm performance - 0.20 (1.02) - 0.21 (1.05) - 0.21 (1.04) - 0.21 (1.04)
Firm size 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Top manager’s political ties - 0.00 (0.12) - 0.01 (0.12) - 0.01 (0.12) - 0.02 (0.12)
Top manager’s experience in a target province 0.41 (0.19)* 0.40 (0.19)* 0.41 (0.19)* 0.40 (0.19)*
Firm acquisitions in a target province 1.01 (0.11)*** 0.99 (0.11)*** 0.98 (0.11)*** 0.98 (0.11)***
Market-size difference - 0.22 (0.06)** - 0.19 (0.07)** - 0.19 (0.06)** - 0.19 (0.06)**
MI difference - 0.11 (0.03)** - 0.12 (0.03)*** - 0.11 (0.03)** - 0.11 (0.03)**
State shareholding 0.00 (0.00) - 0.00 (0.00) - 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Outgoing rotation 0.27 (0.12)* 0.29 (0.12)* 0.41 (0.16)*
Incoming rotation 0.45 (0.12)** 0.46 (0.12)** 0.43 (0.18)*
Outgoing rotation*MI - 0.03 (0.06) - 0.02 (0.07)
Incoming rotation*MI - 0.05 (0.06) - 0.18 (0.07)*
Outgoing rotation*State shareholding - 0.00 (0.01)
Incoming rotation*State shareholding - 0.00 (0.01)
State shareholding*MI - 0.00 (0.01)
Outgoing rotation*State shareholding*MI - 0.00 (0.00)
Incoming rotation*State shareholding*MI - 0.01 (0.00)**
Generalized v2 104,027 104,171 103,943 103,060
- 2 Residual log pseudo-likelihood 923,837 926,261 925,596 925,296



























between incoming political rotation, state shareholding, and marketization-index
difference; we found that its impact on the number of cross-province acquisitions is
negative and statistically significant (b = - 0.01, p\ 0.01). This interaction effect
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Fig. 1 The interaction effect of political rotation, marketization index, and state shareholding on the
number of cross-province acquisitions
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As the plot illustrates, there is a significant spike in the number of cross-province
acquisitions for firms with no state shareholding—approximately between - 3 and
- 6 difference range in marketization indices between acquiring and target
provinces. Contrasting these marketization-index differences with marketization
indices of different Chinese provinces, we could confirm that the spike is
represented by acquisitions from less-developed interior provinces to coastal
provinces. Overall, this finding supports Hypothesis 4.
It is important to note that, as mentioned earlier, having conducted prior
acquisitions in the target province is by far the strongest predictor of future cross-
province acquisitions. In this light, the finding that incoming political rotation
significantly, albeit relatively weakly, impacts cross-province acquisition growth is
even more remarkable. Also, it is interesting that none of the interaction effects with
outgoing political rotation in Model 4 are significant, which may indirectly lend
support to our main idea that incoming political rotation is a larger factor for cross-
province growth than outgoing.
Several robustness checks were made. We investigated whether the high
correlation between market-size and marketization-index differences has implica-
tions for the significance of the latter, as it could have been boosted by a suppression
effect or partially been masked by a mediation effect of the market-size difference.
Specification of the model with omitted market-size difference revealed that the
marketization-index difference variable increased considerably in absolute size (by
80%), which however did not qualitatively affect the statistical test results.
Another aspect of our analysis that may be questioned is the inclusion of
contemporaneous measures of market-size and marketization-index differences,
which we considered in the context of Chinese state capitalism to be relatively
stable year-on-year. To examine how sensitive our results were to this, we replaced
contemporaneous measures with one-year lagged measures in the specification of
Model 4 and re-estimated the model parameters. The results of our analysis
remained unaffected.
Discussion
In this study, we have investigated one possible way in which firms can overcome
barriers to cross-province acquisition growth. Drawing on social network theory, we
propose that in China the rotation of political leaders offers a lever for overcoming
such barriers. Our findings suggest that political rotation intensifies cross-province
acquisitions in both directions—from the former province of the rotated political
leader to the current province, and vice versa. Moreover, we find that incoming
political rotation is especially useful for POEs located in less-developed provinces
aiming to acquire in more-developed provinces.
Our study makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on
social networks in China (Batjargal 2007; Jansson et al. 2007; Michailova and
Hutchings 2006; Sheng et al. 2011). Chinese social networks are known to be small
and geographically concentrated, homogeneous, strong, and with high within-group
trust and density, making them mostly devoid of structural holes and, therefore,
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brokers (Batjargal 2007). This creates structural obstacles for gathering novel
information which could be used to inform new firm strategies and, ultimately,
innovation. These obstacles are further compounded by provincial barriers.
However, even though business networks in China may not include brokers, our
results indicate that business–government networks do, with rotated leaders
functioning as brokers, thus providing non-redundant information to firms. Most
importantly, these brokers span geographically separated clusters, channeling new
information to both clusters. Hence, our results offer an important extension to the
understanding of the structural characteristics of social networks in China.
Second, our results show how social network theory can be enriched by taking
into account a spatial dimension (for a discussion, see Ter Wal and Boschma 2009).
In the literature on political and business connections, the most commonly used
empirical measures of political capital are party membership of top managers and
working experience in the government or military (e.g., Li et al. 2012). Recently,
however, studies have started to emerge that investigate how other, more specific,
forms of political capital such as membership in business associations and
subcontracting for a politically connected firm may matter (Jia 2014; Özcan and
Gündüz 2015). Heeding such adoption of novel measures of political capital, our
study takes a spatial approach. We also control for the commonly used measure of
firm political connections, showing that its effect is insignificant for cross-province
acquisitions, whereas a rotated political leader has a significant effect. This implies
that the effect of political connections may have geographical boundaries and that
generic measures of political capital do not cover the full extent of government
influence on firm strategy. We suggest that a theoretical contribution of our study
lies in showing how specific political connections may have value due to
geographical factors and within certain locales.
Third, our contribution lies not only in conceptualizing the value of specific types
of political connections, but also by showing that a certain strategic behavior is
facilitated by them. The literature on political connections generally theorizes that
managerial political connections bring support, information, and uncertainty
reduction for firms (Lin et al. 2014). In terms of empirical research, however, the
focus has predominantly been on the performance effects of political connections,
with very little empirical attention to what these connections facilitate (Jia and
Zhang 2013; Lin et al. 2014; Luo et al. 2012). A growing body of literature has
recently started to investigate the impact of political connections on strategic
behavior, such as the degree of diversification, internationalization, and innovation
(e.g., Chen et al. 2014; Li et al. 2012). Our study contributes to this literature by
shedding light on firm cross-province acquisitions as a form of strategic behavior
which can also be facilitated through connections to rotated political leaders.
Fourth, our study contributes to the literature on the rotation of political leaders
in China. The field of public economics and administration has an established trail
of studies focused on the explanation of what causes rotation (Li and Zhou 2005;
Shih et al. 2012; Su et al. 2012; Wu 2010). Fewer studies investigate the outcomes
of such rotations, for example, showing that a rotated political leader may exert
influence only in the new province (Zhang and Gao 2008; Zhu and Zhang 2016).
We contribute to this literature by showing that the implications of such rotation on
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business dynamics may reverberate across both new and old provinces. This finding
demonstrates that political rotation may be an important policy tool for not only
controlling morale among cadres and dissemination of best practices, but also for
directly boosting business activity across the provinces.
Finally, our results raise the question of whether these results are unique for
China or whether similar patterns could be observed elsewhere. We believe the
answer is two-fold. On the one hand, information exchange as a mechanism through
which political rotation facilitates acquisitions is universal. On the other hand, the
institution of political rotation is not commonly found. Moreover, China has a
federalist structure with rather autonomous provinces and trade barriers between
them, as well as a relational culture and institutional voids, which render informal
social ties important. All of this counts towards making the results particular to
China.
This study also has implications for managers. On the one hand, the results
indicate that managers can benefit from scanning the political environment and
glean valuable information about acquisition opportunities by connecting with
rotated leaders. On the other hand, cross-province acquisitions may also be the
result of deliberate match-making by political leaders between acquiring and target
firms. If this is the case, then some targets may be a sub-optimal choice for
acquiring firms. However, the fact that political ownership does not moderate the
effect of political rotation on cross-province acquisitions indicates that the effect is
not caused solely by political match-making, as that should be easier to accomplish
for firms under direct political ownership. All in all, our study serves as a reminder
that political connections can be a double-edged sword and, given our belief that
match-making is not the sole explanation for our results, connecting with rotated
leaders should certainly not be avoided altogether.
Limitations and implications for future research
The nature of this study is exploratory and has limitations. In particular, we
conceptualized a rotated political leader as a broker between two provincial
business–government networks and that a symbiotic relationship between such a
leader and firms, especially in the new province, impacts cross-province acquisi-
tions. Prior studies suggest that local leaders do form networks with local firms and,
for example, even present them with cross-border opportunities (China Daily 2017;
Shi, Markóczy and Stan 2014). However, we did not empirically test if local firms
indeed had guanxi ties with political leaders. Future studies could address this
limitation. Another limitation of the study is that we were unable to investigate the
time trend of the impact of political rotations on cross-province acquisitions,
looking, for example, into how fast after the rotation we can observe the effect. The
reason for this is that the multilevel panel structure of our data yielded very few
positive cross-province acquisition events, thereby distorting the potential analysis
of the time trend. This multilevel panel structure of the data, at the same time,
makes it possible to control for firm-level effects while investigating the impact of a
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macro-level political rotation on cross-province acquisitions, therefore offering
certain advantages.
Finally, not all provinces in China have an equal supply of target firms, meaning
that some provinces have more potential targets than others, therefore the target
munificence of provinces might impact our results. It is, of course, also possible that
qualitative characteristics of potential target firms, e.g., ownership and industry,
might vary within and between provinces. It is conceivable that the use of political
rotations by firms differs depending on the type of target firm being acquired—for
example, whether it operates in a different industry and, therefore, presents more or
less risk. Lastly, in this study we followed Persson and Zhuravskaya’s (2008)
definition of political leadership, which takes into account deputy governors and
deputy party chiefs; we stated that these are the levels of political cadres that are
most incentivized to build a symbiotic relationship with local businesses compared
to lower-level cadres, who may be rent-seeking. The latter statement is based on
anecdotal evidence, and we are unaware of any statistics on this matter (Ma, Lin and
Liang 2012). Hence, further probing into what levels of political cadres have more
or less interest in building win–win relationships with local businesses would be
helpful.
Conclusion
In this study, we conceptualized and tested how cross-province rotation of political
leaders impacts cross-province acquisitions in China. We suggested that a rotated
leader becomes a broker between two business–government networks offering firms
information and reputational benefits not otherwise available to them. Our empirical
findings suggest that political rotation facilitates cross-province acquisition growth
and that such rotation is most useful for private firms located in less-developed
provinces aiming to acquire in more-developed provinces. These findings advance
our understanding of the nature of Chinese social networks, the effect of political
connections on firm strategy and the outcome of cross-province political mobility in
China.
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